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Both the Clinton and Bush administrations thought American influence would grow as a result of the U blood pressure medication nightmares generic calan 120mg overnight delivery. Second pulse pressure hemorrhage buy calan paypal, there is a widespread American misunderstanding of both the origin and scope of Islamist apocalyptic terrorism. That threat is enabled to some degree by poverty and social injustice, by grievances over Western policies, and by the authoritarian political cultures of the Muslim world. Its underlying cause is the inability of most Muslim-and especially Arab-societies to effectively adapt to the growing pressures of modernization. Third, there is the dominant cadence of our own political culture: Enlightenment universalism. Our belief in the universal applicability of what is actually a parochial point of view obscures awareness of the true source of Islamic terrorism. Neither Poverty Nor Tyranny When confronted with a novel challenge, the human mind reasons by analogy. We then become prone to reading the world in ways that reaffirm the choice we have made. Since 9/11 most Americans (and many others) have tended to reason by analogy about Islamist terrorism in two basic tropes, both idealist in nature-one quintessentially liberal and one quintessentially conservative. Those who took the poverty approach to deal with terrorism were simply recapitulating the Cold War catechism: Communism festers when impoverished people lack hope in the future. But the idea that stimulating rapid economic growth in Middle Eastern countries would reduce the generation of terrorism is ahistorical. It does not ``settle down' societies; at base, change-even progress-that comes too rapidly to be assimilated is the problem. As to grievances, there is a general tendency to exaggerate the role of Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Arab conflicts in the broader Middle Eastern context. The idea that an IsraeliPalestinian peace arrangement, could one be produced, would reduce the terrorist threat to the United States and the West is delusional. Indeed, Western brokerage of a settlement that leaves a Jewish State of Israel in any borders whatsoever would increase, not reduce, terrorism. In fact, the depredations of Arab autocracies are better accelerators of the frustrations that can congeal into terrorist violence than anything that goes on in Israel/Palestine. Moreover, just as rapid economic growth would produce more angst and, hence, more terror recruits, making Israel the scapegoat to appease radical Muslim demands would only help radicals in their internal social battle against more moderate and traditional forces. Those who think that alleviating poverty in the Middle East and ``addressing the grievances' of our enemies are the best policies to deal with Islamist terror would only substitute different counterproductive policies for current ones. The ``democracy deficit' trope of conservative idealism analogizes the oppression of Soviet and East European societies to that of societies abused by authoritarian governments in the Muslim and especially the Arab worlds. Combined with a simplified version of democratic peace theory, this view encompasses a secular messianist vision of permanent world peace. Its core theory is that terrorists arise because other avenues of political participation are closed off. These violent malcontents blame the West, the United States in particular, for the stultified environments in which they suffer. Liberal templates for understanding Islamist terrorism have fallen behind the ``democracy deficit' analogue in recent years. Not only did the poverty approach fly in the face of obvious facts about 9/11 and other terrorists, but conservative idealists have controlled the bully pulpit 299 F P R I and employed talented White House speechwriters to make use of it. However, the democracy deficit template remains a misleading analogue for understanding Islamist terrorism. Social injustice and acute income stratification have been features of authoritarian Arab and Muslim societies for the entire modern independence era, and even before that. Yet the sort of terrorism we experienced on 9/11 is new; Al Qaeda was founded only in 1988. How can conditions that have existed for decades and even centuries explain this recent phenomenon This has reinforced the downward spiral where decision-makers continue to see the world through the prism of their chosen analogue. The Real Problem the root causes of apocalyptical terrorism have to do with a condition of blocked or distorted modernization. A monumental, culture-cracking collision between the Muslim world and "Westernization" has been ongoing for a century and more, gaining momentum in the last two post-Cold War decades with the accelerating Western cultural penetration of the Muslim world.

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Army Concept for Employment for Current Seabasing Capabilities heart attack jaw pain buy calan 80mg low price, released 19 May 146 F P R I 2010 blood pressure medication excessive sweating calan 120 mg free shipping. In its broad vision, seabasing is about the capability to use the sea in the same way that U. Navy became a global Navy at the turn of the last century-and, arguably, even before. Amphibious warships also constitute the components of a base for forces (primarily U. Marine Corps when justifying incremental improvements in naval expeditionary platforms. Seabasing has never had one generally accepted definition and the term itself has appeared in various formats: seabasing, sea basing, Sea Basing, Enhanced Networked Sea Basing, seabased, sea base, and other variants, all of which connote a specific nuance designed to distinguish it from the others. It does have an official Department of Defense (DoD) definition, but one that many authorities agree is not complete. The current Joint Publication 1-02 (DoD Dictionary) defines seabasing as: "the deployment, assembly, command projection, reconstitution, and reemployment from joint power from the sea without reliance on land bases within the operational area. This is one of the reasons that significant discussions of seabasing have not appeared in the defense literature in the past two years. Gates-kept in his position primarily to 147 F P R I prevail in the "wars we are in"-discounts the likelihood of having to conduct major amphibious operation in the next few years (and certainly not an amphibious assault under fire). Returning to the statement that seabasing is about using the sea in the same way U. This is comparable to the capabilities of a regional land base (relative to the size of personnel assigned). Of course, it cannot provide a golf course- but it can move, thereby making enemy targeting more difficult. Its elements can also be widely dispersed throughout the regional sea, an advantage that can only be duplicated by a network of land bases. What it (seriously) cannot do is provide landing for heavy lift aircraft or store an iron mountain of supplies. Nor can it make an Army or Air Force general feel fully in command of things-an unarticulated determent to the perception of jointness (even if the U. Yet, it can be most assuredly joint-and not simply by operating Army helicopters off aircraft carriers near Haiti. Army forces participated in amphibious assaults along with the Marines in the Pacific, and on their own in the European theater. Although the largest landing force in World War Two (D-Day invasion) operated across a narrow channel, and therefore was well supported by land-based aircraft, such was not true in North Africa or Southern Europe. Largely it has been: 148 F P R I (1) a question of how capable seabasing can be made by applying new technologies and greater resources and whether it is valid in countering anti-access defenses; (2) an issue of the U. Navy appearing to simultaneous oversell the concept and under fund its resources and whether the other Services would support the concept in the joint arena; (3) an issue of the U. An element that adds intensity to the last issue is that seabasing does not require the permission of another nation. Sea Control, Sovereignty and Anti-Access Seabasing is a capability that exploits command of the sea, or less prosaically, sea control. Recently that has not been an issue because of the dominant nature of American naval power, and certainly not since the collapse of the Soviet Navy in 1991. Since that time, American sea control has been a given, unlike the fight to achieve sea control in World War Two. American sea control is not yet broken, presumably allowing the continued viability of seabasing. Navy would provide the vast majority of seabasing platforms out of its own fleet inventory. Originally the Rumsfeld-era Office of Defense Transformation defined sea-base as "a noun; the sea and not the things on it. The ocean is the fluid medium that provides both the terrain and the reduction in friction that allows for the movement of heavy objects. Within the castles are stored and transported the means of military power, including the expeditionary power of the U.

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In July and August 1955 the Nautilus and some conventional submarines of the Guppy-type simulated attacks on an antisubmarine force consisting of a carrier with its aircraft and several destroyers arteria axillaris cheap calan. Even against the Guppies the task force was hard pressed arteriografia purchase calan 80 mg with mastercard, but the Nautilus was almost invulnerable. At great ranges the nuclear submarine could locate the hunter-killer group, but the surface ships could not detect the Nautilus. With its high submerged speed, the submarine could overtake a surface force making 16 to 18 knots and, in certain conditions, even evade the standard torpedo attack. To those officers taking part in the exercises and evaluating the first data, one fact was clear: in combat one nuclear submarine was worth more than several conventional ones. One idea was to build a small hunter-killer submarine, a slow but very quiet ship which could lie in wait for enemy submarines at strategic points. Watkins, commander of the Atlantic submarine force, saw in nuclear propulsion an exceptional opportunity to improve the effectiveness of the hunter-killer. The unlimited endurance of nuclear propulsion would enable the hunter-killer 223 Toward a Nuclear Fleet to proceed to its station submerged and thus undetected over the entire route. Watkins was also greatly impressed by the advantages of high speed which nuclear power offered in attack submarines. Watkins had concluded from fleet exercises with the Nautilus that as attack submarines, the ships in the Skate class would be too slow to avoid underwater detection. The committee urged developing intercontinental and intermediate-range ballistic types, and especially recommended shipboard launching. The Navy already had modified two conventional submarines and several surface ships to carry the Regulus I. Under development since 1948, the Regulus looked like a small airplane, but it was a surface-to-surface air-breathing missile with a range of 575 miles and a speed of 600 miles per hour. There was some Navy interest in building a nuclear submarine to carry a Regulus missile. Navy proponents saw the nuclear-powered guidedmissile submarine as a reasonable step in technology and an excellent challenge to the missile activities of the Army and Air Force. Price called for a nuclear submarine which would carry a missile armed with a nuclear warhead. Anderson suggested a reorganization of the nuclear propulsion program as a step toward defining and establishing responsibility and authority for the development of a complete nuclear propulsion and weapons system. Far from being intimidated by his superior, Carney stuck to the position he had taken before congressional committees earlier in the year, with 224 Chapter Seven only a minor modification to recognize the new interest in hunter-killers. In his opinion the attack submarine still deserved the highest priority for nuclear power, followed by the hunter-killer and the radar-picket submarine. Carney maintained that he did not oppose the application to guided-missile submarines in principle, but he doubted that nuclear power would add much to their effectiveness. He also thought the rapid evolution of missile technology made it prudent to delay until missiles better than the Regulus had been developed. The high priority Carney gave to the hunter-killer was particularly significant to Rickover, who understood the difficulty of fitting a reactor plant into the small hull of this submarine. Anticipating this new interest, Rickover had already begun the design of a reactor for the hunter-killer. After preliminary studies by his own staff, Rickover had convinced the Commission to fund the construction of a prototype under a 1953 requirement. In July 1955 the Commission had selected Combustion Engineering, Incorporated, to develop and build the prototype at Windsor, Connecticut. For this reason it was important to continue the development of the submarine advanced reactor at Knolls. He believed it could be used for either radar-picket or guided-missile submarines. It would take time to understand the full impact of nuclear propulsion and to sort out and evaluate potential applications. As Admiral Jerauld Wright, Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet, put it after reading the final report of the antisubmarine exercises with the Nautilus: "It is urgent that countermeasures be developed for the true submarine and that no future combatant submarine be built that is not nuclear powered. Yet it provided the base for a new effort which would carry Rickover and his organization far beyond their familiar world of Navy bureaucracy, engineering laboratories, and shipyards. The patterns created, not only in administering technical work but also in designing power reactors, would influence nuclear technology in the United States for decades to come.

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